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Summary
The publication on 10 May 2007 of the second section 37 cost report (s37) by the Home Office is, 
as we reported in our response to the first s37 cost report1, intended to allow Parliamentarians to 
monitor the progress of the Scheme and, if there were a “sudden huge escalations in costs”, Par-
liament “will know and be able to take action to stop it before it is too late” 2.
What the report reveals, however, is not a project that is progressing well but rather one that 
appears to be getting out of control, despite the best efforts of the Identity and Passport Service 
to minimise the risks and costs of the Scheme.  The publication of the report therefore suggests 
that independent Parliamentary oversight is urgently needed, to re–evaluate the goals and direc-
tions of the Scheme and, if necessary, directly intervene in the running of the Scheme.
In this report we present our analysis of the government’s latest cost figures, placing them in the 
context of the various activities and reports associated with the Scheme that have occurred dur-
ing the past seven months since the first cost report was issued and the consequent risks that 
have arisen in this time.  In particular, we review the implications of the Strategic Action Plan that 
was intended to reduce the risks and costs of the Scheme, Cabinet Office advice about managing 
the risks of Identity Management for e–government services and other risk factors that could af-
fect the success of the Scheme.  We also reflect on the extent that the recommendations made in 
our first response have been taken into consideration in the second s37 cost report.
Recommendations
The credibility of the Home Office to produce any figures about the state of 
the scheme is being undermined by basic problems.  We recommend an inde-
pendent review of all figures, to ensure that other such mistakes do not ap-
pear again.
We recommend that, as a matter of urgency, Parliament is informed of 
whether the Strategic Action Plan has led to reduced costs or whether the 
original costs of the scheme were underestimated.
We recommend that, as a matter of urgency, Parliament is informed of costs 
to other government departments as they are identified and quantified.
We recommend that Parliament be informed of the complexities and 
challenges in the creation of a contract to redesign the DWP Customer In-
formation System to integrate the National Identity Register.
If iris biometrics have been dropped from the Scheme, we repeat the recom-
mendation made in our first response: Parliament should be informed as to 
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1 With the various reports and responses available, we have used the following notation.  The first s37 report http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/downloads/costreport37.pdf, our first response 
http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk/s37response.pdf,, the second s37 report http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/downloads/2007-05-10CostReport.pdf and this, our second response.
2 Frank Dobson introducing the amendment that resulted in s37.  Hansard 13 February 2006 Column 1221
how a phased-in approach to biometrics will affect the ability of the register 
to achieve stated policy goals. (E.g. if iris scanning is implemented in 2012, 
then the entire population will only be uniquely iris scanned by 2022, thus de-
laying the use of iris scanning to register and verify individuals who can not be 
fingerprinted).
We recommend that Parliament be informed on the cost and effectiveness of 
running 1-to-many verification checks against biometric databases.
Due to high profile attention to the use of the NIR fingerprints to compare 
fingerprints found at scenes of crime, we recommend that additional research 
be conducted and reported to Parliament on the likelihood of false matches, 
i.e. where innocent individuals are identified as possible criminals, and what 
plans the Home Office have in place to deal with such situations.
As the UK Borders Bill is still under consideration by Parliament, we recom-
mend that Parliament address the costs of the ‘Biometric Immigration 
Document’ in light of recent changes in costings on the identity card.
We recommend that the Home Office clarifies whether it has taken Cabinet 
Office guidance into consideration in the development of the Scheme and if it 
has, what the cost implications are likely to be. 
Our main report had warned that public confidence in the Scheme could be 
one of the major factors affecting its success.  We therefore repeat the rec-
ommendation from our first response that: “The DWP and OGC should im-
mediately publish the information as required by the Information Commis-
sioner and cease any appeals to prevent its release”.
We presume that the cost of the extra interview locations required for the 
biometric footprint enrolment process are included in the government’s fig-
ures, but given the high profile coverage the Passport application by interview 
process has already received, the risks of public opposition to this part of the 
Scheme are likely to be higher than those estimated by the Home Office.  We 
recommend that the Home Office conduct and release new assessments of 
costs of ‘refuseniks’.
We recommend that the Government’s position on liability issues around the 
use of the Scheme be clarified.  If compensation for potential fraud is to be 
provided by the government, then the likely costs that would arise need to be 
disclosed.
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Given the latest evidence regarding the challenges in assuring the lifespan of 
identity documents and technologies, we recommend that the Home Office 
inform Parliament on the contingencies in place and their likely costs in the 
event of chip failure.
We recommend that a formal debate be held after each s37 report is issued 
to allow for the implications of the cost reports to be discussed.
We recommend that the consequences of late delivery of future reports be 
clarified, so that Home Office is kept in line and is no longer able to claim that 
“four weeks in ten years is not significant”.
T h e  L o n d o n  S c h o o l  o f  E c o n o m i c s T h e  Po l i c y  E n g a g e m e n t  N e t wo r k
4
REVIEW OF THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THE 
SECOND S37 COST REPORT
In contrast to the first s37 cost report, which consisted almost entirely of statements on the likely 
benefits of Identity Cards, coupled with aggregate figures for the set-up and operation of the 
Scheme, the second s37 cost report provides more detail about how the figures were arrived at.
Discrepancies remain with the details of the second s37 cost report, however.  In their Table 1, the 
Home Office presents the estimated costs from the previous report (although the previous re-
port had listed the operational costs at £5,100 million rather than the more detailed £5,130 mil-
lion in this report).  The Home Office then acknowledges that the basis for the calculations for 
the previous report had been incorrect and that they had erroneously included (operational) 
costs of £510 million that should have been incurred by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
in running consular services abroad.  Thus, their Table 2 gives the correct figures that should have 
been reported in the first s37 cost report.
The Home Office then states that, as a consequence of updating their business case, they have 
identified that their previous staff estimates had been too low and so they have increased these 
costs.  These costs are distributed across the 10 year period (£60 million from 2007/08 to 2013/
14, £20 million thereafter).  This would appear to add £460 million to the total costs3.  However, 
their Table 3 has operating costs rising by only £390 million, a difference of £70 million4.  In addi-
tion, set–up costs appear to have risen without explanation, to £300 million (up £10 million)5. 
Thus the total expenditure over this period has risen by £400 million.
Finally, the Home Office updates the cost estimates from the period October 2006–October 
2016, to April 2007 to April 2017.  To do this, they deduct estimated expenditure for the first six 
months of £200 million and add estimated costs for the last six months (£300 million).  The fig-
ures are adjusted to allow for inflation (a 2.7% increase) and the resulting amounts are presented 
in their Table 4.
It is unclear where the estimated expenditure in the first six months of £200 million is intended 
to have been spent.  Procurement on the Scheme has not yet started6 and even if it had, would 
have been unlikely to have incurred such a large amount of expenditure in such a short period of 
time7.  Similarly, total expenditure on the Scheme from the start of the 2003/04 financial year to 
September 2006 (the last available figure) is only £58 million.  In addition, it is unclear why opera-
tional costs in the last six months of the period would be 50% higher than running costs in the 
first six months (£300 million rather than £200 million).
The £300 million being spent in the last six months being reviewed implies an annual operational 
cost of the Scheme of £600 million (up from the estimate given during the Parliamentary debate 
of £584 million).  It also indicates the level of verification fee income that the Scheme needs in 
order to break even.  Although the Scheme is intended to bring in a variety of benefits to gov-
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3  2006/7 £0, 2007/8 £60 m, 2008/9 £60 m, 2009/10 £60m, 2010/11 £60m, 2011/12 £60 m, 2012/13 £60 m, 2013/14 £60 m, 2014/15 £20 m, 2015/16 £20 m = £460m.
4 This difference might be due to different accounting periods, i.e. calculating costs from April or October
5 This is possibly the 2.7% adjustment for inflation included in Table 4.
6 The first Prior Information Notice has just been issued http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/downloads/National_Identity_Scheme_Prior_Information_Notice2007.pdf 
7 According to a written answer, the Home Office has not yet requested the additional funds required for the Scheme [Answer to 131373] 
ernment and society8 it must be paid for through a combination of the fees charged for enrolling 
in the Scheme, “a small contribution from public funds” and “income that could be derived from 
contracts with organisations that use the database” 9 (i.e. payments for the use of the verification 
services).  Assuming around 5 million enrolments per year at that time, each paying the equivalent 
of a £30 registration fee and hence bringing in about £150 million per year, this leaves a shortfall 
of £450 million to be covered by the charge the Home Office levies for formal verifications of 
identity against the National Identity Register.
At first sight, therefore, apart from minor issues of presentation, the cost report appears to sug-
gest that, within reason, things are not going too badly for the Scheme.  There are, however, a 
number of issues whose significance the cost report fails to acknowledge.
 
First, time and again, the Home Office has insisted that its costings for the Scheme are robust and 
have been independently checked.  The revisions to Table 1, however, show that previously re-
leased figures were out by 9.4% (£510 million out of £5240 million).  No discussion is presented 
as to how such a large figure could be incorrectly included in the previous cost report.
The credibility of the Home Office to produce any figures about the state of 
the scheme is being undermined by such basic problems.  We recommend an 
independent review of all figures, to ensure that other such mistakes do not 
appear again.
Second, the report states that “the cost estimates and business case have been updated to reflect 
the Strategic Action Plan”10.  Although the report includes increased costs associated with a re–e-
valuation of the staffing on the Scheme, other aspects of the Strategic Action Plan, such as the 
dropping of iris biometrics and re–use of existing Government databases should have had a no-
ticeable effect on the costs of the Scheme (although, as we argue below, they could also lead to 
increased risks and costs for other aspects of the Scheme).  If the statement about the costs and 
benefits of the Strategic Action Plan having been taken into account are to be taken at face value, 
then either the radical redesign of the Scheme has had no other effect on the costs of the 
Scheme, or the previous estimates of costs were much higher than Parliament had previously been 
told. 
We discuss our expectations of the Strategic Action Plan on costs, below.
We recommend that, as a matter of urgency, Parliament is informed of which 
of these cases has arisen.
Third, the figures presented in the second s37 cost report continue the Home Office trend of ex-
cluding those costs that are not directly attributable to the Home Office.  Whilst this satisfies the 
wording of section 37, it goes against the spirit of the requirement.  In order to assist deliberation 
of the Scheme we summarise the different aspects of these costs below.
We recommend that, as a matter of urgency, Parliament is informed of the 
costs to other departments as they are identified and quantified.
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8 Identity Cards Scheme Benefits Overview http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/downloads/2005-06-27_Identity_Cards_Scheme_Benefits_Overview.pdf 
9 Charles Clarke Hansard, 13 February, 2006 : Column 1119, For more detail on this, see our analysis of Home Office Accounting http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk/accountingreport.pdf March 2006
10 Section 1.2
COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the second s37 cost report is the limited effect that the Strate-
gic Action Plan issued in December 2006 has had on costs of the Scheme.  As stated in the intro-
duction to the Strategic Action Plan, its purpose was to “keep risks and costs down, by using ex-
isting Government investment and delivering incrementally, based on extensive piloting and tri-
alling”11 however, as noted above, the only cost effect appears to have been an increase in staff 
costs.
The plan was released as a written statement on the last day before the House of Commons rose 
for the Christmas recess and presented a radical redesign of the Scheme to address “the most 
common criticisms [that] they are high–risk and too expensive”12.  The Home Secretary, John 
Reid, however, denied that it was a u-turn claiming that “Doing something sensible is not neces-
sarily a u–turn”13.
The Strategic Action Plan represents a radical rethink of the design of the Scheme.  It removes a 
number of aspects of the Scheme that we have previously indicated as being high risk and high 
cost.  However, we argue, in so doing, it also adds a range of additional costs that do not appear 
to have been considered in the updated cost figures presented to Parliament.
The National Identity Scheme as represented in the Strategic Action Plan differs from earlier ver-
sions of the scheme in two important ways and these differences can be seen particularly in 
terms of the evidence presented by the Identity Cards programme to the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Select Committee14.
From a single, new databases to multiple existing databases
The first aspect of the redesign is around the technological infrastructure of the scheme.  The 
earlier version of the scheme foresaw developing the National Identity Register on a new data-
base built from scratch with the high levels of security needed for a database containing sensitive 
information about 60 million people included from the start.  Another benefit of building a brand 
new database would be to ensure that it could cope with the volume of enrolment and verifica-
tion transactions that the Scheme would be likely to produce.
In terms of security, Nigel Seed told the Select Committee: “Security is not going to be an add–
on, it is being done now.  We have not even gone out with our requirements.  The security is em-
bedded within my procurement team. … The security of the data centre itself is down to even 
very basic things like making sure it is not on or near a floodplain.  We are looking at all that sort 
of stuff, right from very basic level access and flooding and losing it that way right the way through 
to hacking”15.
Katherine Courtney told the committee that the idea was for a single, ‘logical’ database that “may 
involve a series of data storage solutions”16 but also clarified “I did not mean to imply that a solu-
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11 Strategic Action Plan p. 2
12 Reid abandons giant ID system, Catherine MacLeod, The Herald 20 December 2006
13 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6192419.stm 
14 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmsctech/1032/103202.htm 
15 Answer to Q344
16 Answer to Q346
tion might involve stringing a number of legacy databases together.  That has never been part of 
this proposition.  We have always said that our requirements are for a data repository that could 
be populated one record at a time”17.
The Strategic Action Plan18 suggests, however, that existing government databases will now be 
used for the key elements of the system.  Biometric information will be stored “initially” on exist-
ing biometric systems used for asylum seekers and biometric visas, biographical information will 
be stored on the Department of Work and Pension’s Customer Information System and techni-
cal, PKI, data will be stored on existing UKIPS systems.
The second s37 cost report states that “studies have concluded that it is lawful and feasible” 
to use the DWP’s Customer Information System to host the biographic element of the Regis-
ter19.  However, the costs and practical issues associated with this step do not appear to have 
been fully considered.
It is widely recognised that adding high–level security to existing databases is extremely problem-
atic and so it must be assumed that each of these databases has been selected because UKIPS is 
confident that each system already has the requisite level of security.  (Although the recent ad-
mission that the Department of Work and Pensions sent bank and personal details of 26,000 pen-
sioners to the wrong addresses20 gives limited confidence that basic information management 
policies are in place with that database).
These new uses of the databases are going have implications on the performance of the existing 
systems and it is not at all clear whether the existing systems will be able to cope with this new 
load.  They would certainly not have been designed with this load in mind.  
Further issues will arise with the inevitable contract renegotiations that will follow between these 
departments and their technology suppliers.  More generally, there is growing evidence that alter-
ing contracts midway through their terms is likely to be problematic and costly.  Indeed, it is not 
even clear how the payments for this additional use of existing infrastructures will be made.  Will 
the payment be made directly from UKIPS or will they be paid by the host government depart-
ments?
We recommend that Parliament be informed of the complexities and 
challenges in the creation of a contract to redesign the DWP Customer In-
formation System to integrate the National Identity Register.
Dropping the use of iris biometrics
The second major redesign with the Scheme comes from the apparent decision to longer include 
iris scanning as part of the enrolment and verification process (although the second s37 cost report 
states that “The recording of iris biometrics is also an option”21).  When the Identity Cards pro-
gramme appeared before the Select Committee, their reasons for using multiple biometrics were 
clear.  Katherine Courtney told the committee: “There has been a recommendation that no single 
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17 Answer to Q366
18 Paragraph 15
19 Page 4 Emphasis added
20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6349041.stm 
21 Appendix 1
biometric is the solution.  What we are looking for from the multiple biometrics is a system com-
bined with the checking of people’s biographical footprints … that allows us to attempt to avoid a 
duplicate registration of identities”22.  She continued: “There is no single biometric today that is 
universally applicable to everybody.  You may have individuals, for example, who have lost their 
hands and are unable to register fingerprint biometrics but would be able to register a face and 
irises.  We were looking to create a scheme that was universally accessible for people and that 
was one of the important reasons”23.  A similar point was made by Dr Henry Bloomfield: “What 
we may do is use fingerprint and iris biometrics in conjunction so that if it turns out that your 
fingerprint matched against a few other people’s fingerprints in the database, it is possible that an 
iris biometric may then be used to discriminate amongst those people”24 and again by Katherine 
Courtney: “You cannot record someone’s fingerprints if they do not have any fingers.  That is a 
known limitation and one of the reasons behind our intention to use multiple biometrics to try 
to overcome that limitation”25.
The Strategic Action Plan, however, only mentions iris recognition once26, stating that the intro-
duction of iris biometrics “also remains an option”.  Moreover, despite earlier claims that iris bio-
metrics would be used for residence permits issued to foreign nationals, the Home Office re-
cently announced that even these will now only rely on facial biometrics and fingerprints27.
If iris biometrics have been dropped from the Scheme, we repeat the recom-
mendation made in our first response: Parliament should be informed as to 
how a phased-in approach to biometrics will affect the ability of the register 
to achieve stated policy goals. (E.g. if iris scanning is implemented in 2012, 
then the entire population will only be uniquely iris scanned by 2022, thus de-
laying the use of iris scanning to register and verify individuals who can not be 
fingerprinted).
Facial biometrics remain part of the new ‘biometric’ passports that have been issued since March 
2006.  However, a recent report by the National Audit Office28 stated that “current facial recogni-
tion technology is not reliable enough to enable the automated checking of applications against 
the full database of existing passport holders although the Identity and Passport Service is piloting 
its use on a smaller scale”29.  This is, in part, because of the limited resolution (300 dpi) of the fa-
cial image.
Thus, to ensure that no individuals are enrolled in the Scheme more than once, the Scheme will 
now combine a biographical footprint check with a biometric check of individuals already en-
rolled in the Scheme.  Given the problems with facial biometrics, this must be done using finger-
prints.  However, the Strategic Action Plan notes that: “biometric technology identifies small per-
centages of what are known as ‘false matches’ or ‘false non–matches’”.  In order to deal with this 
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22 Answer to Q292
23 Answer to Q293
24 Answer to Q295
25 Answer to Q302
26 Para 65.
27 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6258139.stm 
28 http://www.nao.org.uk/pn/06-07/0607152.htm 
29 Para 3.1
issue, “expert human assessment” is required and it envisages that this “will build on resources 
which currently exist within government”30.
Scaling up the expert human assessment of cases of fingerprint false matches and false non–
matches to be able to cope with the number of annual enrolments into the Scheme is likely to be 
costly, especially if existing resources are not to be diverted from crime scene analysis (although 
the Prime Minister, writing to individuals who had signed the online petition against ID cards, sug-
gests otherwise: “The National Identity Register will help police bring those guilty of serious 
crimes to justice.  They will be able, for example, to compare the fingerprints found at the scene 
of some 900,000 unsolved crimes against the information held on the register”31,32).
We recommend that Parliament be informed on the cost and effectiveness of 
running 1-to-many verification checks against biometric databases.
Due to high profile attention to the use of the NIR fingerprints to compare 
fingerprints found at scenes of crime, we recommend that additional research 
be conducted and reported to Parliament on the likelihood of false matches, 
i.e. where innocent individuals are identified as possible criminals, and what 
plans the Home Office have in place to deal with such situations.
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30 Para 50
31 http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10987.asp 
32 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/news/maccartoon.html?in_page_id=1831&in_date=231106 
IDENTIFIED COSTS TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS
We have previously expressed concern at the lack of disclosure of the costs to other government 
departments.  Despite clearly articulated goals for reducing fraud and enabling access to govern-
ment services, the Home Office has been unwilling to disclose the costs of implementing the 
scheme across key government departments despite arguing these benefits during the Act’s pas-
sage through Parliament.  The Home Office has been unwilling to even discuss the costs to the 
other components of the Home Office, such as to border agencies and police.  Whilst we under-
stand some of these costs may fall outside of the strict interpretation of the requirements for s37 
reports, as the Scheme develops, the costs to other parts of Government are now becoming 
clearer and there is a strong argument for them being disclosed to Parliament as they become 
available.
As noted above costs of £510 million are now allocated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice.  However, the second s37 cost report does not explain how the Home Office came up with 
this figure, nor why it is now a burden for the FCO to bear.  Parliament should be told precisely 
how “consular services abroad” will cost £510 million over this period.   Perhaps citizens regis-
tered abroad for passports or ID cards will be processed through entirely different systems, but 
we would find this to be a surprising development.  It is hard to imagine how the fingerprinting 
and registration of foreigners and the fingerprinting and registration of UK citizens at home and 
abroad are somehow separate programmes.  In the same way, we believe that future reports 
should also include the costs to the Immigration and Nationality Department (IND).  
The Home Office has declared that the cost of implementing the scheme for extending permits 
to foreign nationals is now £200 million (their Table 5).  We wish that there was greater clarity in 
how the Home Office came up with this amount.  Such clarity would help us to understand 
other costs that have not yet been accounted for, such as the costs of issuing identity cards to all 
foreign nationals, including visa holders coming to the UK for extended periods, non–EEA foreign 
nationals already settled in the UK and EEA nationals visiting the UK for an extended period of 
time.
When discussing the costs of issuing cards to foreign nationals, the second s37 cost report men-
tions the “Biometric Immigration Document”.  This BID is being created under secondary legisla-
tion within the UK Borders Bill, which will “in due course” be designated under the Identity 
Cards Act powers.  This BID “will have the functionality of an ID Card and the holder will also be 
subject to obligations such as registering changes of address with the National Identity Sche-
me”33.  As such, this would appear to be a cost of implementing Identity Cards that is not in-
cluded in the Home Office costs “for providing passports and ID Cards to British and Irish citi-
zens resident in the UK”.  The requirement for s37 reports does not specify that the costs be lim-
ited to British and Irish citizens resident in the UK, rather it states that the Secretary of State 
should report on “the public expenditure likely to be incurred on the ID cards scheme”.
As the UK Borders Bill is still under consideration by Parliament, we recom-
mend that Parliament address the costs of the ‘Biometric Immigration 
Document’ in light of recent changes in costings on the identity card.
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FURTHER SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Since the first cost report was issued, the Cabinet Office has released a report34, on Identity Risk 
Management for e–government services.  The report is intended to provide centralised advice on 
identity risk management for e-Government.  It does this based on a process for assessing risk 
and providing detailed specifications of the kinds of action that should be taken for each level of 
risk, i.e. Identify service level; Select appropriate processes; Confirm residual risk and Handle spe-
cial cases35.
The report identifies four levels of risk (0–3)
Level Zero: Services are those which involve a ‘best endeavours’ relationship between 
the service provider and the individual requesting the service.
Level One: Relates to services where there is an obligation on the part of the service 
provider to make all reasonable efforts to provide the service to the requesting party.
Level Two: The relationship between the parties is formal.
Level Three: Represents the highest potential impact in cases of possibly falsified or 
mistaken identity for online services. The likely impacts here include damage to prop-
erty, severe embarrassment to an individual, significant financial harm to an organisa-
tion (including the service provider) and possibly physical harm to individuals.
The risk assessment process is given in Supplement E of the report, where scores are allocated 
for different kinds of threat factors that a particular service might face.  To use the assessment 
scheme, for each identified threat, the government department must decide how likely the threat 
is and allocate the appropriate score.  Thus, if threat 5 (“individuals would be severely tempted to 
produce forged proof of identity and / or eligibility in order to gain access to the service”) is 
deemed possible, then 4 is added to the total risk score for the Scheme. 
Figure 1 Taken from Supplement E: Threat Factors
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35 Page 1
Having obtained a total risk score for the Scheme, this is compared against a table of security lev-
els and risk factors (Figure 2).  Using the most generous readings of the security risks likely to be 
faced by the Identity Cards Scheme gives it a risk rating of level 3.
Figure 2 Taken from Supplement E: Thresholds
A risk level three has: “the highest potential impact in cases of possibly falsified or mistaken 
identity for online services. The likely impacts here include damage to property, severe embar-
rassment to an individual, significant financial harm to an organisation (including the service pro-
vider) and possibly physical harm to individuals” … “Level Three represents the most sensitive 
kinds of service which should be brought online given the inherent nature of the Internet and its 
users. Where the risk exceeds the ceiling for this group, then the viability of the service as an on-
line offering should be reviewed. For Level Three services there is always a requirement for 
strong initial proof of identity and strong authentication in service delivery”36.
Although it is arguable that the risks associated with the NIR are higher than is covered in the 
Cabinet Office guidance document (i.e. because any security breaches could have an impact on 
many people, not just isolated individuals which appears to be the main focus of Level Three), the 
advice about Level Three authentication (i.e. someone who is in the system confirming their 
identity) is clear:
“Clients will authenticate themselves to the system by the presentation of a digital 
certificate. This will be held in an access token, which would ideally be a smart card, 
token or mobile device. Clients will demonstrate their right to that credential through 
the use of a private key and a password or biometric. The system will authenticate 
users based on the validity of public key / private key pairs and on the validity of the 
credential. Username/password combinations are not acceptable for 
Level 3 authentication”37.
It is instructive to compare this guidance with recent (2007) Home Office descriptions about 
how users will access the Scheme:
“There will be a number of different methods of verifying identity under the National 
Identity Scheme ranging from a visual check of the card, which will not require a card 
reader, to card authentication, PIN verification and up to biometric verification where 
a high level of identity assurance is required”38.
“Design work with potential users of the identity verification service remains ongoing. 
As such, it is not possible to state which services and information will be available on-
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line to ID card holders through the use of a personal identification number at this 
time.”39
Such statements suggest that the Home Office is unaware of this guidance from the Cabinet Of-
fice.  Given the considerable security issues associated with the Scheme (which we summarized in 
chapter 14 of our main report40) this is rather worrying.  Moreover, if this guidance is to be taken 
into consideration, it is likely to have a significant impact on the costs of the Scheme.
We recommend that the Home Office clarifies whether it has taken this guid-
ance into consideration in the development of the Scheme and if it has, what 
the cost implications are likely to be. 
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OTHER RISKS AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SCHEME
The broad, socio–political context of the Identity Cards Scheme raises a series of further risks to 
the Scheme in both the short and longer term.  Many of these risks carry possible cost implica-
tions.
Short term
Political uncertainty
In the short term, it would appear that the most significant risks to the Scheme are not techno-
logical but political.  As we reported in our previous response41, in July 2006, the Chancellor Gor-
don Brown appointed Sir James Crosby to lead the Public Private Forum on Identity Manage-
ment.  The terms of reference for this review42 were to:
a) Review the current and emerging use of identity management in the private and public 
sectors and identify best practice.
b) Consider how public and private sectors can work together, harnessing the best identity 
technology to maximise efficiency and effectiveness.
c) Produce a preliminary report for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Ministerial 
Committee on Identity Management by Easter 2007.
Presumably this preliminary report has been delivered as it is known that Sir James will now be 
producing a full report which will be delivered in late summer43.  Given the overlap in scope be-
tween the Crosby review and the operation of the Identity Cards Scheme, the late delivery of the 
final report suggests that this is one of the policy areas that Gordon Brown might be reviewing if 
he becomes Prime Minister.  Indeed, press reports are already indicating that such a review is 
possible44.
The main opposition parties remain resolutely opposed to the Scheme45. In February 2007, David 
Davis, the Shadow Home Secretary, wrote to Sir Gus O'Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary, saying 
that the Tories would cancel the scheme “immediately on our being elected to government” and 
urging the government to take the risks of future cancellation under a Conservative administra-
tion into account in the procurement for the scheme.  Mr Davis also wrote to a number of IT 
suppliers informing them of the Party’s policy.
As Dunleavy et al. (2006) note: “The considerable costs of making a relatively fixed investment in 
a particular type of computer system, with a particular software and defined programmes and 
routines written within it, thus add a significant layer to the insulation of current policy orienta-
tions”46.  This embodying of policy in code perhaps explains why the Conservatives were con-
cerned that the Scheme, once implemented, would be difficult to unroll.
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46 Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., and Tinkler, J. Digital era governance: IT corporations, the state and e-government, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
They were perhaps not expecting the response they got from Intellect, the trade association for 
the UK hi–tech industry, where John Higgins, the Director General of Intellect, wrote to Mr Davis 
stating: 
Firstly, it is important to state that the UK technology industry is neither for, nor 
against the policy of introducing ID cards in the UK.  This public policy debate took 
place and was voted upon in Parliament. 
As an industry we are now working hard with the Identity and Passport Service to 
ensure that the ID cards procurement results in solutions which are practical and 
deliverable.  To this end, we believe it is wholly inappropriate for the industry to be 
used as a mechanism for scoring political points. 
Moreover, it is highly likely that the manner of this intervention will undermine the 
confidence of the supplier community in any future Conservative Government hon-
ouring other contractual commitments which may have been entered into by previous 
administrations. 
This raises an interesting question for Parliament to consider:  in the affairs of government pro-
jects, who has supremacy?  Previous contracts between government and contractor or the will of 
a new Parliament?
Medium term
Public confidence in the Scheme: A question of openness
The appointment, in October 2006, of James Hall as the first Chief Executive of the Identity and 
Passport Service has signaled a new spirit of openness within UKIPS, which has helped with the 
external scrutiny of the Scheme.  Mr Hall has increased the level of dialogue with key actors and 
constituencies in this complex policy domain.
In particular, James Hall has held two ‘webchats’ about the Identity Cards Scheme, on 14 Novem-
ber 200647 and on 5 March 200748.  UKIPS has gone public on test errors with its new computer 
systems and other IT projects, a level of openness has been widely recognized as good practice49.
In the same spirit, the UKIPS vision appears no longer to be to provide the “gold standard of 
identity”50 but rather to become “the trusted and preferred provider of identity services”51.
However, as we reported in our first response, other aspects of the Scheme remain deliberately 
hidden.  In our first response, we reported on the Information Commissioner’s ruling that the 
Gateway Reviews of the Identity Cards Scheme be made public.  The government appealed this 
decision and the case went to an Information Tribunal in March 2007.
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The Tribunal’s decision was made on 2 May 2007 and called for the Gateway reviews to be dis-
closed52.  The decision report presents a detailed summary of the reasoning followed by the Tri-
bunal in making its decision.  However, of particular significance were the claims that there had 
been specific briefing on Freedom of Information during training for the Gateway Review process. 
According to the witnesses called, this had suggested that:
there was little risk of GR’s [Gateway Reviews] being disclosed under FOIA or other 
means, which appears to have come from the briefings. Only in cross examination did 
some of the witnesses recognise that there could be no guarantee of non–disclosure. 
Mr Herdan said “OGC practice was that this information would not be disclosed and 
that people could talk without fear and that it would be non-attributable to them, but 
we were not able to say that there was a 100 percent guarantee that this information 
would never get into the public domain”53.
In addition, a previous Select Committee inquiry and report54 had presented strong evidence in 
favour of the view that Gateway Reviews could be made public, including claims from a number of 
IT vendors that they would be comfortable with such an arrangement.
Our main report had warned that public confidence in the Scheme could be 
one of the major factors affecting its success.  We therefore repeat the rec-
ommendation from our first response that: “The DWP and OGC should imme-
diately publish the information as required by the Information Commissioner 
and cease any appeals to prevent its release”.
Public confidence in the Scheme: Enrolment
In March 2007, UKIPS released more information about its new application by interview process 
for first time passport applicants55.  This process will form the basis of the biographical footprint 
checks that will be a significant element of the enrolment process for the Identity Cards Scheme.
Biographical footprint checks involve face–to–face interviews with registrants of 10–20 minutes 
duration. “At the interview, customers will be asked basic information about themselves—not 
deeply private information, but information that can be checked to confirm that they are who 
they say they are”56.
These interviews will initially be targeted at first time applicants for passports, taking place at the 
69 new interview centre locations57.  This is based on UKIPS assumptions of 600,000 first time 
passport applicants per year58.  In comparison, the Home Office are expecting 4,220,000 new and 
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renewed passports in 2010–1159, all of which will need to be subject to authentication by inter-
view before they can be issued with Identity Cards.  News reports suggest that the questions will 
be drawn from a list of 200 possible questions60. 
This news report continues: “Applicants will be asked to confirm facts about themselves which 
someone attempting to steal their identity may not know but to which the interviewers al-
ready know the answer.  Mr Herdan (executive director of the Identity and Passport Serv-
ice) said there would be no pass or fail mark but officials would make a judgment on the basis of 
the whole interview whether an applicant was telling the truth”61.  The process will involve “third 
party authentication of biographical information”62.
This means, at the very least, the interviewers will have access to vast amounts of personal infor-
mation about each individual enrolling in the scheme.  The practical implementation of this proc-
ess would involve collating this information at the interview location, before the interview begins. 
There appears to be no formal guarantee that this collated information will be destroyed after 
use.
In the Home Office response to the LSE alternative blueprint63, it was stated that “The LSE claims 
that the Government plans to vet people’s ‘life history and activities’ in the enrolment process” 
continuing “We have no intention of vetting a person’s life history and activities.  We are simply 
confirming the true existence of an identity before issuing an ID card—that is not the same as 
obtaining details about someone’s life activities or their credit history”64.
We presume that the cost of the extra interview locations required for the 
biometric footprint enrolment process are included in the government’s fig-
ures, but given the high profile coverage the Passport application by interview 
process has already received, the risks of public opposition to this part of the 
Scheme are likely to be higher than those estimated by the Home Office.  We 
recommend that the Home Office conduct and release new assessments of 
costs of ‘refuseniks’.
Public confidence in the Scheme: Civil liberties issues
In recent months, there has been growing public awareness about the civil liberties issues associ-
ated with identity cards and other forms of surveillance.  In November 2006, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office, released a specially commissioned report on “A Surveillance Society”65. 
In March 2007, the Royal Academy of Engineering published a report “Dilemmas of privacy and 
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64 Page 11
65 http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/surveillance_society_full_report_2006.pdf
surveillance: Challenges of technological change”66.  Both these reports received extensive press 
coverage.
Since then, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee has launched an inquiry into “A 
surveillance society?”67 which includes, in its terms of reference, “Home Office responsibilities 
such as identity cards”.
In addition, the House of Lords Constitution Committee has launched a separate inquiry into 
“the Impact of Surveillance & Data Collection”68.  Again, its terms of reference include specific 
mention of identity cards as examples of information systems and processes used to identify indi-
viduals and information about them
The LSE Identity Project submission to the Home Affairs Committee is available on our website 
http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk.
Questions of liability
Another risk that has not been highlighted by the second s37 cost report is associated with ques-
tions of liability if the verification services provided by the Scheme are used in the public and pri-
vate sector.  In an article published in December 200669 Toby Stevens, Director of the Enterprise 
Privacy Group, notes that it is only a matter of time before the integrity of the National Identity 
Register is compromised and, when that happens, “false identities and multiple identities will be 
issued; legitimate identities will be stolen or modified; citizens will fail to report changes in their 
records.  Businesses will be obliged to enter into transactions with only these compromised cre-
dentials to prove the identity of the other party”70.  This means there will be a de facto “transfer 
of liability for the integrity of the National Identification Register away from the government and 
on to businesses”.  Yet if the companies have little choice but to use the Scheme to verify identi-
ties, then issues of liability seem unfairly focused on the business users rather than shared with 
government.
One response to such a situation would be for the government to provide limited financial assur-
ance against fraud and compensate companies that have fallen victim to identity crimes associated 
with their use of the Scheme.  Doing so, however, would increase the costs of the Scheme.
We recommend that the Government’s position on liability issues around the 
use of the Scheme be clarified.  If compensation for potential fraud is to be 
provided by the government, then the likely costs that would arise need to be 
disclosed.
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Long Term
As the second s37 cost report notes, “costs are subject to the completion of a number of competi-
tive tendering processes, which have not yet started”.  Thus, there remains uncertainty and risk 
about the long term implementation and effectiveness of the Scheme.  However, some long term 
issues are known.
Reliability of the technology
In February 2007, the National Audit Office issued a report on the Introduction of ePassports71. 
As the second s37 cost report states, this acknowledged that the introduction of ePassports had 
been managed well and implemented on time and on budget.  The NAO also noted, however, that 
the UKIPS should reduce its reliance on external consultants for such key projects (they had 
spent £4.9 million on full time consultants between March 2003 and November 2006, £322,000 
on fixed–term contractors and £82,000 on permanent staff72).
The NAO also warned that there was only a small number of suppliers who were able to pro-
duce the biometric chips needed for ePassports (and who would, presumably, be responsible for 
the chips in Identity Cards).
According to the NAO, the durability of the chip for the full ten year life of an ePassport “remains 
unproven”.  They note that the manufacturers are currently only providing a chip warranty for 
two years73 although it is unclear what the warranty actually covers74.
Our main report had raised the concern that chips might need to be replaced within the 10 year 
life span of each identity card.  The Home Office response to the LSE Blueprint on the Scheme75 
refuted this claim, stating: “The Government has consulted a cross section of the card manufac-
turing industry and the majority has indicated that a 10 year card life would be feasible. Indeed, 
Hong Kong’s ID card is forecast to have a 10 year life. Meanwhile, Communications Electronic Se-
curity Group (CESG) has designed an electronic security scheme that will remain robust for 10 
years against people trying to create forged cards”76.
Given the latest evidence regarding the challenges in assuring the lifespan of 
identity documents and technologies, we recommend that the Home Office 
inform Parliament on the contingencies in place and their likely costs in the 
event of chip failure.
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WHEN THE REPORT WAS PUBLISHED
Section 37 of the Identity Cards Act is very clear about the obligation to provide reports on 
costs to Parliament:
37 Report to Parliament about likely costs of ID cards scheme
(1) Before the end of the six months beginning with the day on which this Act is 
passed, the Secretary of State must prepare and lay before Parliament a report 
setting out his estimate of the public expenditure likely to be incurred on the ID 
cards scheme during the ten years beginning with the laying of the report.
(2) Before the end of every six months beginning with the laying of a 
report under this section, the Secretary of State must prepare and lay before 
Parliament a further report setting out his estimate of the public expenditure 
likely to be incurred on the ID cards scheme during the ten years beginning 
with the end of those six months.
(3) References in this section, in relation to any period of ten years, to the pub-
lic expenditure likely to be incurred on the ID cards scheme are references to 
the expenditure likely to be incurred over that period by the Secretary of State 
and designated documents authorities on—
(a) the establishment and maintenance of the Register;
(b) the issue, modification, renewal, replacement, re–issue and surrender 
of ID cards;
(c) the provision to persons by the Secretary of State of information re-
corded in individuals’ entries in the Register.
(4) If it appears to the Secretary of State that it would be prejudicial to securing 
the best value from the use of public money to publish any matter by including 
it in his next report under this section, he may exclude that matter from that 
report. 77
The Act received Royal Assent on 31 March 2006, with the new Identity and Passport Service 
created on 1 April 2006.  The first s37 report was issued by the Secretary of State on 9 October 
2006 (the first day that the House sat, after the summer recess).
Thus, according to the Act, the second cost report was required to be laid before Parliament no 
later than 9 April 2007 (six months after the first report was issued).  The House rose for Easter 
recess on 29 March 2007 and returned on 16 April 2007.  Thus, the report could have been issued 
before the House rose (on any date up to 29 March 2007) or shortly after the House returned 
(16 April 2007).  The Strategic Action Plan was issued on 19 December 2006, the last day of busi-
ness before the House rose for the Christmas recess.
On 25 April 2007, the Junior Minister Joan Ryan gave a written answer about the costs of the 
Scheme, where she noted
Revised cost estimates have been published from time-to-time, for example, when the 
Identity Cards Bill was introduced to Parliament. During the passage of that legisla-
tion, the Government agreed to lay a report before Parliament every six months, 
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which sets out the estimated cost of the National Identity Scheme for the coming 10 
years78.
The minister answered a further question on costs79 on 30 April 2007, repeating the information 
that the total expenditure on the Scheme to the end of September 2006 was £58 million since 
the start of the 2003–04 financial year.
On that same day, she also gave an oral answer in Parliament to a direct question about when the 
second cost report would be issued.
Dr. Vincent Cable (Twickenham) (LD): Will the Under-Secretary explain why the ID 
card cost report, which was due to be published a month ago, did not appear, even 
though the Government have a legal obligation to ensure its publication?
Joan Ryan: The costs will be presented, as we are committed to doing, in the cost re-
port, which will be published shortly and in the Identity and Passport Service annual 
accounts for 2006-07. The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that the report will be 
before him soon80.
The report was finally issued on 10 May 2007, the same day as Tony Blair announced his plans to 
step down as Prime Minister.  Opposition parties and the press questioned the timing of the issu-
ing of the report as an attempt to “bury bad news”.
According to The Independent:
The Home Office said the delay was "not significant" and denied that the report had 
been postponed because of last week's council elections.  
According to The Scotsman:
A Home Office spokeswoman denied the delay claims.  “The announcement has been 
in the diary ... it is no secret”, she said.  “We have not been able to publish it exactly 
six months after the last one because parliament has been in recess. A delay of just 
four weeks is not significant when it comes over a 10-year period.”
The Herald reported:
Last night, the Home Office said April 9, when the new ID costs were expected to be 
released, had fallen during Westminster’s Easter holiday and the department had re-
leased the figures “as soon as we possibly could”.  The timing with Mr Blair’s depar-
ture announcement was coincidental, a spokeswoman insisted.
The claims that the report was issued as soon as possible after the Easter break, on a date that 
was always in the diary, is difficult to reconcile with the statements by the Junior Minister.  If the 
date for the report to be issued had been agreed, Parliament could have been informed of this on 
25 April 2007 or even 30 April 2007.
The risks of politicians choosing to ignore the implications of their own rules were recognized by 
John Locke who, writing in his Second Treatise on Government, noted that:
because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for 
the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the 
power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the 
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laws they make and suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private 
advantage and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the commu-
nity, contrary to the end of society and government81.
As a result, he recommended:
in well-ordered common-wealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it 
ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assem-
bled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when 
they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they 
have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them 
for the public good.82
Although s37 was intended to allow Parliamentarians to monitor the progress of the costs of the 
Scheme, the late release of the report is hampering Parliament’s abilities in this role.  Moreover, 
there appears to be no formal mechanism for Parliament to act after the reports are issued.
We therefore recommend that a formal debate be held after each s37 report 
is issued to allow for the implications of the cost reports to be discussed.
We further recommend that the consequences of late delivery of future re-
ports be clarified, so that Home Office is kept in line and is no longer able to 
claim that “four weeks in ten years is not significant”.
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REVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OUR FIRST 
RESPONSE
Our first response made a series of recommendations for future s37 cost reports, with the inten-
tion of improving their usefulness for Parliamentarians.
We made eighteen recommendations and are pleased to see that some appear to have been in-
corporated in the second cost report.  Others, however, have been overlooked and we reassess 
their relevance.
Recommendations Implemented? Commentary
1. Future s37 reports should provide 
annual cost estimates and not just 10–
year totals for both set up and operat-
ing costs.
Partially implemented The detailed disclosure of the addi-
tional staff  costs over the next ten 
years is a step in this direction
2. They should include a detailed 
breakdown of how the projected costs 
presented during the Parliamentary 
process compare to the current esti-
mates in all future reports.
Implemented Tables 1–4 provide this information 
for comparison
3. Parliament should be informed as to 
funds expended to date and how these 
funds were disbursed (including con-
tractors’ names).
Partially implemented As noted above, Parliament has only 
been provided with total expendi-
ture so far (£58 million) and the 
deduction of estimated costs of 
£200 million for the period Octo-
ber 2006–April 2007. 
4. The reports should explicitly state if 
cost elements are excluded for pro-
curement reasons.
N/A As procurement has not yet begun, 
this recommendation is not applica-
ble at this time
5. Future s37 reports should describe 
in detail any policy and design changes 
that have led to changes in cost struc-
tures and how these relate back to the 
stated benefits. Any changes to the 
Scheme must be announced and con-
trasted with statements made when 
the Bill was in Parliament.
Not implemented As noted above, there has been a 
radical redesign of the Scheme, the 
details of these changes in terms of 
costs, benefits or design decisions 
have not been reported on or con-
trasted with earlier statements 
made to Parliament.
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6. Following from the recommendation 
from the  KPMG report, a formal 
process should be put in place to link 
the Programme risk register and risk 
assessments to the factors considered 
for the estimation of optimism bias/
contingency factors. The risks on the 
programme risk register could be 
grouped into the four areas of overall 
risk considered in the determination of 
the optimism bias adjustment factors. 
A weighting could be assigned to the 
risks within each category. This process 
should also be communicated with 
Parliament, potential vendors, and the 
general public.
Not implemented This is not reported on.
7. The Home Office should proceed 
with a new round of OGC reviews of 
the Scheme due to the significant 
changes that appear to have now taken 
place. Because of the lack of Parliamen-
tary scrutiny of the new Scheme, this 
review and all internal reviews be 
made public.
Not implemented It is not clear if the radical redesign 
of  the Scheme has resulted in a new 
round of OGC gateway reviews.  As 
noted above, the results of the pre-
vious Gateway reviews have not 
been made public.
8. The Home Office should reveal 
whether and to what extent its cost 
estimates have been reviewed by per-
sons or bodies independent of the 
Home Office, giving the dates, pur-
poses and conclusions of such reviews.
Partially implemented Although not explicitly stated, the 
disclosure of incorrect attribution 
of  costs indicates that a separate 
review of the costs has been under-
taken.
9. Parliament should be informed as to 
whether the roll out of biometric 
identity cards for UK citizens will be 
based, in the first instance, on finger-
print identification only, or whether 
other biometrics (e.g. iris recognition) 
will be used from the start.
Not implemented As noted above, the dropping of iris 
scanning can only be inferred from 
various government statements.
10. Parliament should be informed as 
to how a phased-in approach to bio-
metrics will affect the ability of the 
register to achieve stated policy goals. 
(E.g. if iris scanning is implemented in 
2012, then the entire population will 
only be uniquely iris scanned by 2022, 
thus delaying the use of iris scanning to 
register and verify individuals who can 
not be fingerprinted).
Not implemented There is no information on this, in 
part a consequence of the lack of 
clarity noted in 9.
11. If UK passport policy is being 
driven by Schengen area requirements, 
Parliament should be informed about 
the relative costs of  issuing such bio-
metric travel documents in the Schen-
gen area and those issued in the UK.
Not implemented The House of Lords European Un-
ion Committee report on the 
Schengen Information System does 
provide some indication of the 
costs associated with Schengen.
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12. The Government should begin dis-
closing non-commercial design deci-
sions such as the number of  enrolment 
centres, so that Parliament can better 
understand the extent of the Scheme.
Partially Implemented The locations of the 69 centres for 
the application by interview for first 
time passport holders have been 
disclosed.  The far larger number of 
centres for ID card enrolment has 
not been disclosed.
13. The DWP and OGC should imme-
diately publish the information as re-
quired by the Information Commis-
sioner and cease any appeals to pre-
vent its release.
Not implemented See discussion above.
14. Parliament should be informed, as a 
matter of urgency, when trials of bio-
metric technology will take place, how 
long the trials are intended to run for 
and how the results of the trials will 
feed into the procurement process 
Not implemented No information about any recent 
biometric trials has been made 
available
 15. The Government should respond 
to the criticism of the Science and 
Technology Committee on the increas-
ing confusion over the stated purpose 
of the scheme.
Not implemented The stated purposes of the Scheme 
remain open, including a claim by 
the Prime Minister that “The case 
for ID cards is a case not about 
liberty but about the modern 
world” 
 16. The Government should explain to 
Parliament why the existing systems of 
visa verification by employers are in-
sufficient and open a consultation pe-
riod to solicit comments on regulatory 
costs and implications
Not implemented
 17. The Government should conduct a 
consultation with health practitioners 
on social exclusion and identity re-
quirements
Not implemented
 18. The Home Office should inform 
Parliament on the timeline for project 
deployment so as to create greater 
certainty
Partially implemented The Strategic Action Plan indicates 
that the first cards will be issued in 
2009 with “significant volumes” of 
ID cards being issued along with 
passports from 2010
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